Computationally Sound Abstraction and Verification of Secure Multi-Party Computations

Michael Backes, Matteo Maffei & Esfandiar Mohammadi
We devise an abstraction of secure multi-party computations in the applied $\pi$-calculus. Based on this abstraction, we propose a methodology to mechanically analyze the security of cryptographic protocols employing secure multi-party computations. We exemplify the applicability of our framework by analyzing the SIMAP sugar-beet double auction protocol. We finally study the computational soundness of our abstraction, proving that the analysis of protocols expressed in the applied $\pi$-calculus and based on our abstraction provides computational security...
This data center is not currently reporting usage information. For information on how your repository can submit usage information, please see our documentation.
We found no citations for this text. For information on how to provide citation information, please see our documentation.