Data from: Human cooperation based on punishment reputation

Miguel Dos Santos, Daniel J. Rankin & Claus Wedekind
The threat of punishment usually promotes cooperation. However, punishing itself is costly, rare in non-human animals, and humans who punish often finish with low payoffs in economic experiments. The evolution of punishment has therefore been unclear. Recent theoretical developments suggest that punishment has evolved in the context of reputation games. We tested this idea in a simple helping game with observers and with punishment and punishment reputation (experimentally controlling for other possible reputational effects). We...
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These counts follow the COUNTER Code of Practice, meaning that Internet robots and repeats within a certain time frame are excluded.
What does this mean?