Data from: Group-size diversity in public goods games

Jorge Peña
Public goods games are models of social dilemmas where cooperators pay a cost for the production of a public good while defectors free ride on the contributions of cooperators. In the traditional framework of evolutionary game theory, the payoffs of cooperators and defectors result from interactions in groups formed by binomial sampling from an infinite population. Despite empirical evidence showing that group-size distributions in nature are highly heterogeneous, most models of social evolution assume that...
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